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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the empirical foundation for policy reform prescriptions suggested by 
the institutional approach to economic growth. The focus is the relationship between institutional 
reforms, measured by changes in a country's political or civil rights, and economic growth. 
Empirical models previously estimated using cross-section data are extended by adding a temporal 
element. This allows an estimation of the timing of benefits following a reform. In addition to 
finding support for the idea that institutional reforms can cause increases in economic growth, five 
major implications emerge: (i) the economic benefits of freedom reforms are systematic and 
significant, (ii) economic benefits, in the form of increased growth, occur with a lag after the 
initiation of a reform in political rights or in civil liberties, (iii) reforms in civil liberties eventually 
require a reform in political rights in order to be sustained, (iv) changes in the capital-to-labor ratio 
have a larger effect on economic growth in the short run than in the long run, and (v) there remains 
significant and unexplained regional variation in the short-run effects of changes in the capital-to-labor 
ratio. 
FREEDOMS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: 
TRANSmONAL AND PERMANENT COMPONENTS 
Sure-fire recipes for accelerated and sustained national economic growth and development 
remain a mystery; even though donor agencies and foundations have committed hundreds of billions 
of dollars to technical assistance and development and growth, economists have for decades 
researched and studied the topic (Lucas 1988). In fact, the recent evidence for the lower income 
economies that have benefitted from donor support is discouraging (World Bank 1991, USAID 1989). 
During the decade of the 1980s the lower income nations made little progress in improving their 
economic status. Moreover, there is no widely accepted empirical basis for distinguishing between 
those nations that did grow and develop and those that did not. In short, despite an abundance of 
anecdotal evidence and arm-chair theorizing, the policy disciplines have not solved the puzzle of 
sustained economic growth. 
Available theories on economic growth and development have generated a number of 
hypotheses on potential determinants. In the contemporary literature, for example, different theories 
have for periods captured the imagination of the policy disciplines, and the policy professionals 
responsible for programming development assistance. Institutions (Commons 1934), technological 
change (Solow 1957), human capital (Schultz 1964), infrastructure (Mellor 1976), economic policy 
(Balassa 1971; Johnson 1973) and increasing external returns to knowledge (Lucas 1988) are 
examples. More recently, the research on economic growth and development has focused on 
institutions and contracts, returning to the themes of Commons and his contemporaries (De Soto 
1989; Olson 1982; North 1990; Clague and Rausser 1991; Williamson 1991). 
These modem approaches have presented a widened lens linking political rights, civil rights and 
economic rights with results on the organization and functioning of competing interest groups and the 
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fuller understanding of the roles of incentives, incentive compatibility, contracts and credibility 
(Clague and Rausser 1991). The new democracy initiative of USAID and the attention given to 
processes of policy reform by the donor organizations exemplify the implicit support for the modern 
institutional approach to programming for economic growth and development. 
The empirical results in this paper respond to the challenge of the new institutional approach to 
economic growth and development policy. The analysis utilizes an aggregate production function 
consistent with both neoclassical and sustainable growth theories and incorporates a set of indices on 
political and civil rights with national income account aggregates measuring economic performance 
for 125 countries during the period 1972-1988. Exploratory work using these liberty indices along 
with variables describing economic performance has already been conducted (Scully 1988, Grier and 
Tullock 1989, Barro 1991). In contrast to earlier work, our analysis allows an assessment of the 
causal relationships between political and civil freedoms and the dynamics of economic growth. 
Moreover, our framework admits a measurement of the size and timing of the benefits realized from 
reforms of institutional rights. 
Institutions and Economic Growth 
The modern theory for linking institutions, broadly conceived as both the rules of the game and 
organizations, to economic growth and development is just emerging (Buchanan 1989; North 1991; 
Olson 1991; Ruttan 1991; Rausser 1982, 1990). At the heart of the new theory of institutional 
economics is the idea that the setting in which policies are made or formulated or the "rules by which 
rules are made," or the "policy culture" are a critical determinant of sustained economic growth and 
development. This theory goes beyond the idea of rent seeking (Krueger 1974) to identify both 
productive and predatory roles for interest groups and government (Rausser 1982). In concept, the 
constitutional setting, the legal and regulatory framework, the authority and history of the bureaucracy 
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(Allison 1971), and the political, civil, and economic rights implied by this complex set of factors 
govern the possibilities for sustained national economic growth and development. 
Research to expand the analytical basis for applying the ideas from this new institutional 
approach has taken a number of directions. Game theory models have been used to study the 
strategies of interest gtoups or agents in competing situations (Rausser and Zusman 1992). Economic 
functions have been dissected to understand the impacts of ownership and control on the behavior of 
economic agents, and the principal agent problem. Complexities of the operations of large and multi-
function economic units have been evaluated for impacts on behavior (Williamson 1985). And, the 
incentives in differing types of contracts and contracting arrangements have been analyzed (Tirole and 
Laffont 1990). A major contribution of these results to date has been to seriously question existing 
theories of economic gtowth. The more conventional theories have in large measure taken as "given" 
the very aspects of the national political and economic systems that are the focus of the analysis on 
institutional-constitutional economics (Buchanan 1989). 
Formal economic growth models have been extended to improve explanations of sustained 
economic growth (Lucas 1988, Romer 1986). Traditional models of economic growth emphasizing 
capital accumulation predict gtowth until a zero growth rate steady state is reached, a prediction in 
contrast to the experience of sustained growth in developed economies. Rather than rely on 
exogenous technological change as an "explanation" of sustained growth, these more recent 
approaches search for specifications that generate sustained nonzero equilibrium gtowth rates. By 
specifying a production technology with increasing external returns to human capital these models can 
explain, without the aid of external shocks, economies with sustained economic growth. In addition 
to a technology of goods production, the technology of institutions can be defined to transfer wealth 
between sectors, and supply public goods that sustain productivity growth (Murphy, Shleifer and 
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Vishny 1991). In short, change in institutional technologies can potentially be an important 
explanation of an economic growth. 
Empirical Approach 
In many recent empirical growth models, average rates of economic growth conditioned by 
production function arguments have been related to indices of political and civil rights recorded at 
particular points in time (Scully 1988; Barro 1991; Grier and Tullock 1989). These studies have 
produced promising results, showing an association between higher growth and enhanced political and 
civil rights. However, these findings are also consistent with an alternative hypothesis: that richer 
countries can afford more liberal political and civil rights systems. Clearly, differentiation between 
these two causal hypotheses has far-reaching implications for development assistance and national 
strategies for economic growth. If the direction of causality is from economic growth to institutions, 
programs that attempt to produce growth through changed policies and institutions are flawed. 
However, if economic growth is produced by changes in political, civil and economic institutions, 
then initiatives addressing these fundamental features of societal organization can be successful. 
Previous empirical work measuring economic growth models has utilized only cross-section 
data, an approach that has become standard in this area of empirical research. Scully uses 95 
countries and averages GDP growth rates over 25 years and Freedom House institutional measures 
over 15 years. Barro uses 98 countries and averages country data on growth and on revolutions and 
assassinations over 26 years. DeLong and Summers use 25 countries and average their economic data 
over 26 years, and match these averages with policy and institutional measures from the World 
Competitiveness Report in 1983, from the World Bank Development Report in 1983 and 1987, and 
with information on import barriers measured by Barbine in 1988. Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1991) augment Barro's data set (data averaged over the period 1960-1985) with college enrollment 
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ratios measured in 1970. The empirical results from these and other studies of cross-section 
economic performance are reviewed in Levine and Renalt (1992). While these authors conclude that 
the most important determinant of economic growth is investment, an alternative methodology 
provides justification for including measures of institutional rights. 1 
Presumably there are two justifications for the cross-section studies. The first is that economic 
growth is a long-run phenomenon, and is best measured through averages over long time periods, and 
that annual data are contaminated with short-run ~noise." A corollary is that there are no interesting 
or measurable short-run relationships among institutions, policies, and economic performance. A 
second justification is that political, institutional, and policy measures have little temporal variation 
within countries, and that measurements across countries capture the main sources of variation. 
Unfortunately, the existing cross-section approach can neither be used to measure causality nor 
the timing of responses to reforms in institutions. An alternative to identifying long-run features 
through averaging the data over long time periods is to utilize time-series econometric methods to 
decompose annual data into their ~permanent" and ~transitory" components. This approach has the 
advantage of utilizing temporal variations in these data to provide evidence on causality and timing 
issues. 
In measuring an empirical relationship between two variables: 
'Levine and Renalt examine the fragility of empirical relationships found in cross-<:ountry growth 
regressions. Using an extreme-bounds analysis suggested by Leamer (1983), Levine and Renalt conclude that: 
Although there are many econometric specifications in which macroeconomic indicators-taken 
individually or in groups-are significantly correlated with growth, the cross-<:ountry statistical 
relationship between long-run average growth rates and almost every particular macroeconomic 
indicator is fragile. National policies appear to be a complex package, and future researchers may 
wish to focus on macroeconomic policy regimes and interactions among policies as opposed to the 
independent influence of any particular policy. 
Levin and Renal! find one robust correlation, between GDP growth and investment, and suggests that the 
relationship between institutional freedoms and economic growth is fragile. However, McMillan ( 1993) finds 
that lbe relationship between institutional freedoms and economic growth is robust if an alternative method for 
""-ling with multicollinearity, principal components, is used instead of the extreme bounds approach. 
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Y, - ~ x, ' 
a researcher must first determine the time period for which the equation is valid. The belief that 
economic growth is a long-run phenomenon suggests measuring t for equation (1) in periods of 
decades or longer. An alternative approach is to decompose annual observations of y into two 
components, permanent (y,} and transitory (y(): 
• + 
Y, - y, + y, . 
If equation (1) identifies a long-run relationship, then estimation of (1) using y; as a dependent 
variable will correctly identify the parameters of (1). Additionally, there may be short-run 
(1) 
(2) 
relationships between these variables that can be identified by using y, + as a dependent variable. The 
decomposition of time series is frequently made using ARMA models, where predicted values of the 
ARMA model yield the permanent component (y,) and the actual minus the predicted, or the 
estimated error, yields the transitory component (y;). 
Model Specification 
The motivation for the empirical model, common to standard studies of economic growth, 
begins with an aggregate production function relating aggregate output to the inputs of capital, labor, 
and shifters of the production function. This yields a relationship between the growth rate of 
aggregate output (y), the growth rate of the capital-to-labor ratio (k) and changes in shifters of the 
production function (s): 
Y, - {3 k, + 8 s, (3) 
where f3 and 8 are the products of the marginal productivity of capital and production function shifters 
and the capital intensity of the economy. 
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As described in the previous section, a time-series ARMA model is used to decompose per 
capita GDP growth rates into their permanent and transitory components. This model is estimated 
with the restriction that the same process determines evolution of the GDP series in all countries. 
The method differs from previous time-series modeling of GOP series that allow ARMA parameters 
to vary by country (Bannerjee, Lumsdaine, and Stock 1992). This approach is used to avoid the 
rhetorical allocation of effects of institutions to differences in estimated parameter differences across 
countries. Thus, our approach is a two-step procedure where the first step is the decomposition of the 
growth series, and the second step is an empirical model that uses the components from the first step 
as dependent variables and economic and quantified institutional features as explanatory variables. 
Note that a cross-section model of the long-run relationship may be obtained as a special case 
of the pooled model if per capita GDP is generated following a stationary process, and there is no 
temporal variation in the independent variables. Since Bannerjee, Lurnsdaine, and Stock find 
nonstationarities in the GDP series for some countries, and since the annual data indicate that there 
are significant variations in institutional measurements, the pooled model should yield preferred 
estimates of the parameters of equation (1). 
Data 
The data for the empirical analysis are Freedom House indices of political and civil rights 
(Gastil 1987) and the Penn World Table database on national income accounts (Heston and Summers 
1992). The sample covers 1972, the earliest year for which Freedom House indices are available, to 
1988, the last year for which economic data are available in version IV of Heston and Summers Penn 
World Tables. Annual national capital stocks are estimated from the Penn World Table data. 
The dependent variables in equation (1) are alternatively the permanent and transitory 
components of annual per capita GDP growth rates, derived from fitting an ARMA model to the GOP 
--- --- -----
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growth series. These independent variables are grouped by class. The first class, economic and 
demographic variables, include: 
GDP 
GROWKL 
POPCHG 
RGDPTT 
Per capita gross domestic product, parity purchasingpower corrected in 1980 U.S. 
dollars 
The difference in the logarithms of the capital-to-labor ratio between the current and 
previous years 
The difference in the logarithms of population between the current and previous years 
The level of real gross domestic product (with terms of trade adjustment) 
The second group of variables measures levels of the institutional features. These ratings are 
constructed by the Freedom House through a simple averaging of ratings for different features of a 
nation's political rights or civil rigbts (seven features for political rights and 13 features for civil 
rights). The political rights rating measures the degree of representativeness or democratization of a 
particular government. The civil rights rating measures whether basic liberties are protected. Each 
item or point in the list is given a score of 0, I or 2 based on a set of procedures that is standard 
across countries and years. These raw scores are then averaged and represented by a 7-point scale, 
with I being the most free or with the most rights and 7 being the least free or with the most 
restrictions on rights. 
For political rights, most western European democracies are Is while nations ruled by despots 
that feel little constraint from public or popular tradition are 7s. Civil rights are Is for nations in 
which publication aod e:tpression are not closed, especially if the intent is to influence legitimate 
political processes. The scale level of 7 is for nations where there is pervasive fear, little independent 
expression, and a police-state environment. 
The qualitative variables measuring institutional features are: 
P10R2 
P3T05 
C10R2 
C3T05 
Takes the value 1, if the political rights have a scale value of 1 or 2, 0 otherwise 
Takes the value 1, if the political rights have a scale value of 3 to 5, 0 otherwise 
Takes the value 1, if the civil rights have a scale value of 1 or 2, 0 otherwise 
Takes a value of l, if the civil rights have a scale value of 3 to 5, 0 otherwise 
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Thus, the Freedom House indices were compressed into three instead of seven scale values. Also, to 
avoid singularity by construction, the qualitative variables representing the scaled values of 6 and 7 
were omitted. 
Table 1 summarizes annual means and standard deviations of economic and institutional 
variables for 125 countries. The institutional measures are annual ratings of political and civil rights 
produced by the Freedom House (see later discussion for more detail). Table 1 suggests that there is 
significant temporal variation in these institutional variables within a given country. The standard 
deviation of political rights measured across countries is 2.035. The average standard deviation of 
political rights within countries is .64. There are 18 countries with standard deviations greater than 
1.3 (twice the standard deviation within countries) of their political rights measure. The average 
standard deviation of civil rights measures measured across countries is 1. 831. The average standard 
deviation of civil rights within countries is .56. There are 14 countries with standard deviations 
greater than 1.1 of their civil rights measure. The empirical approach of this research utilizes these 
additional sources of variation in identifying relationships between institutional measures of freedoms 
and economic performance. 
The last group of variables is again qualitative and designed to permit impact estimation of the 
timing and magnitude of the institutional changes for each of the countries: 
RPD 1 Takes the value 1 if the nation has had a political right scale value less than the 
historically highest for one year, 0 otherwise 
RPD2-RPD5 Similarly defined variables with the number of years political rights had a scale value 
less than the historically highest indicated by the identifiers 2 through 5 
RCD 1-RCDS Defined using the same procedures as for political rights, but for civil rights 
These qualitative variables are illustrated for the example of Bangladesh in Table 2. In 1972, 
Bangladesh had a political rights rating of 4. This rating rose to 5 in 1975 and fell to 4 in 1976. The 
year 1976 is then defined as the beginning of a reform, and the qualitative variable RPD1 takes a 
value of one for this year. In 1977, this reform is sustained, so the variable RPD2 takes a value of 
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one for this year. Similarly, RPD3, RPD4, and RPDS take values of one in 1978, 1979, and 1980. 
In civil rights, there are two Bangladesh reforms, one initiated in 1977 and one initiated in 1984. 
Each of these reforms is sustained for five years, with the variables RCD1, RCD2, RCD3, RCD4, 
and RCDS taking values of one in years following the initiation of a reform in a manner similar to 
political rights. These qualitative variables allow the estimation of an empirical model that addresses 
the issue of causality of political and civil rights reforms on economic growth and measures the 
magnitude and timing of the effects. 
Estimation 
In regressions that combine cross-section and time-series data, the set of right-hand side 
variables need not explain all of the systematic variation in the left-hand side variable. A general 
expression of the error term when empirically estimating equation (1) is: 
(4) 
where ll1; is the systematic component associated with the i" geographic unit, s, is the systematic 
component associated with the t" time period, and IL• is a random error. Two strategies have been 
proposed to exploit this additional source of systematic variation: a "fixed effects" estimator that 
involves a dummy variable transformation of ll1; and s, and a "random effects" estimator that involves 
the estimation of (1) by application of Generalized Least Squares. As Mundlak (1978) has shown, a 
decision between the fixed effect approach and the random effect approach is unnecessary, since the 
effects are in fact random and the fixed effect estimator can result in inferences conditional on the 
sample used in the estimation. Of course for this interpretation of the fixed effects estimator, the 
applicability of parameter estimates to populations outside the sample depends on whether the sample 
used in estimation is random and representative. 
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Qualitative variable construction can transfonn the 111; and s, into observed elements whose 
effects may be directly estimated. The estimated version of equation (1), after substituting the fixed 
effect transformation of equation (3) into equation (1) is: 
Y. = {3 X• + p F• + o D• + r z. + ~-'• (5) 
where x. is a vector of production function inputs, F. is a vector of qualitative variables measuring 
freedoms, o. is a vector of qualitative variables measuring durations of reforms in freedoms, and Z;, 
is a vector of regional qualitative variables. Regional variables are defined with the Middle East 
countries omitted to prevent singularity. The country groups for the geographic effect (with numbers 
of countries in parentheses) are: 
AMER 
ASIA 
AFRI 
EURO 
North and South American continent countries (29) 
Asian countries (18) 
African ( 44) 
Europe (23) 
There were 11 Middle Eastern countries in the sample. 
Results 
Table 2 shows the results of fitting low-{)rder ARMA models to the per capita GOP growth rate 
data. Five ARMA models fit are: AR(l), AR(l) MA(l), AR(2), AR(2) MA(l), AR(2) MA(2). 
Three criteria to select among the five models estimated are the Aikike Infonnation Criteria, the chi-
square statistic testing the residuals for white noise, and the t-ratios measuring the significance of the 
estimated coefficients. The chi-square statistics quite clearly reject the hypothesis that the raw series 
of GOP growth rates represents white noise. 
The top row of Table 2 tests the annual growth rates for white noise. Since the chi-square test 
statistic rejects the hypothesis of white noise, some type of ARMA modeling can improve prediction 
of future GOP growth rates. The chi-square test of residuals from the AR(l) model does not reject 
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the hypothesis of white noise, so this model is not used. The estimated coefficients of an AR(2) 
MA(2) model are not individually significant, so this model is also disqualified. Adding an MA term 
to the AR(2) model reduces the statistical significance of the AR(2) term and the MA(l) term. This 
leaves us with two models for decomposing the per capita GDP growth series: AR(l) MA(l), and 
AR(2). Second-stage estimations are completed using each of these decompositions. Since the 
second-stage results using either of these series are similar, only results using the AR(l) MA(l) 
decomposition are reported. 
Table 3 shows the results of the pooled regressions where the dependent variables are the 
permanent and transitory decompositions of per capita GDP growth rates. The effect of capital 
accumulation on GDP growth is larger in the transitory phase than in the long run, as is seen from 
the estimates of .45 for the variable CKL when the dependent variable is the transitory component, 
compared with the estimate of .16 for the variable CKL when the dependent variable is the permanent 
component. Neither the level of GDP nor the rate of population growth is significantly related to 
economic growth. Dummy variables indicate that permanent rates of growth are slightly higher in 
Asia than in Europe, Africa and the Americas, and larger than the excluded group, the Middle 
Eastern countries. 
Civil rights contribute about a one-third of a percentage point to the permanent component of 
annual GOP growth. The dummy variables for civil rights reforms suggest that reforms in civil . 
rights, after a lag of two years, lead to higher per capita GDP growth rates. 
Estimated coefficients from the transitory component regression suggest why the benefits of 
reforms changing rights might be difficult to implement. Since many of the political reform 
transitional coefficients (RPD1-RPD5) are negative, and larger in magnitude than the coefficients in 
the permanent component regres;ion, the benefits to a reform are shown to be slow to accrue. Since 
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the level effects of institutions were not significant, the regression was also estimated excluding these 
variables. This respecification did not materially change the results. 
The differing transitory and permanent effects of reforms are illustrated in Figure 1, which 
plots the permanent and transitory effects on economic growth of reforms in civil rights and political 
rights for each of five years following the initiation of a reform. The net effect in a single year is the 
sum of the permanent and transitory components. In the case of political rights, this net effect is 
negative, and large, for the first three years following a reform. 
One of the significant differences between the permanent component and transitory component 
regressions is the differing effect of changes in the capital-to-labor ratio on economic growth. These 
results are comparable to the calculated estimates of DeLong and Summers (1991). These authors 
refer to research by Jorgenson (1988) which postulates that the depreciation of equipment will cause a 
stronger short-run than long-run relationship between investment and growth. DeLong and Summers 
calculate that an increase in equipment investment of one percentage point will result in an increase in 
the percapita GDP growth rate of .39 percentage points after one year, and an increase in the 
percapita GDP growth rate of .17 percentage points after 25 years. 
These results suggest that civil rights reforms have a positive effect on the permanent 
component of economic growth, while political rights reforms have a negative effect on the transitory 
component of economic growth. In order to understand the total effect of reforms on growth, it is 
necessary to understand the interactions between these two types of reforms in rights. Table 4 breaks 
down the interrelationships between reforms in civil rights and political rights. For the 2125 country 
years in the sample, 1440 did not experience a reform in basic liberties. Of the 121 reforms initiated 
in civil rights, 73 were not accompanied by a contemporaneous reform in political rights. Similarly, 
of the 118 reforms initiated in political rights, 61 were not accompanied by a contemporaneous 
reform in civil rights. 
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Table 4 suggests a different relationship between successful reforms in civil rights and 
successful reforms in political rights. Of 64 reforms initiated in political rights without a reform in 
civil rights, 49 of the sustained reforms were not accompanied by a reform in civil rights after five 
years. This contrasts with 32 successfully sustained civil rights reforms out of 73 initiated without an 
accompanying reform in political rights. Thus, the typical civil rights reform required an 
accompanying reform in political rights in order to be sustained, and these political rights reforms 
were likely to produce short-run declines in GOP growth. 
A final analysis is to assess the regional differences in responses to reforms. Tables 5 and 6 
report regression results for equation (1) estimated for each geographic region using alternatively the 
permanent component of GOP growth as the dependent variable (fable 5), and the transitory 
component of GOP growth as the dependent variable (fable 6). 
The results of Table 5 suggest that the permanent effect of freer political institutions is negative 
in Asia and positive in Europe. The results of Table 6 suggest that the largest source of regional 
variations in growth rates comes through different effects of changes of the capital-to-labor ratio on 
economic growth. These rates range from a high of . 79 for North and South America to a low of .26 
for European countries and .31 for Asian countries. A model was estimated to allow the slope of the 
change in the capital-to-labor ratio variable to vary with institutional levels. This specification was 
not supported by the data. 
It may be easier to appreciate the magnitude of these results if they are stated in comparison to 
changes in the capital-to-labor ratio. A reform in civil rights that raises a country from the least free 
rating to the most free rating in civil rights is likely to add about .4 percent to that country's 
permanent growth rate. Using the estimate of CKL of .158 obtained from Table 3, a similar rise in 
the capital-to-labor ratio of 2.4 percent will produce the same change in growth rates. For the sample 
--- --- - -- --- -- -- ------- --- -------
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mean of a capital-to-labor ratio of II, 708 in 1980 U.S. dollars and a population of 33 million, this is 
equivalent to an annual additional investment of $9.3 billion in this nation's economy. 
Conclusions 
These empirical results have five broad implications for policy reform and economic growth: 
• The economic benefits of a reform in rights are systematic and significant 
• Economic benefits, in the form of increased growth, occur with a lag after the initiation of 
reforms in political rights or in civil rights; 
• Reforms in civil rights require a reform in political rights in order to be sustained, while 
the converse is not true; 
• Changes in the capital-to-labor ratio have a larger effect on economic growth in the short 
run than in the long run; and 
• There remains a significant and unexplained regional variation in the short run effects of 
changes in the capital-to-labor ratio. 
The analysis of the cross-country and intertemporal data linking political and civil rights has 
produced results that support the broad-scale policy interventions often advocated for improving 
economic growth in developing nations. The model, though largely descriptive, parallels standard 
aggregate production specifications in neoclassical growth theory. Institutional variables for political 
freedom and civil rights are introduced to obtain estimates of the effects of both level and changes in 
institutions. The latter effect provides the principal basis for the conclusion that the institutional, 
constitutional, and policy changes leading to improved political and civil rights contribute 
systematically to higher and sustained economic growth. The remaining puzzle, aside from 
refinements in the estimates related to improved structure and data, is how to make and sustain the 
institutional, constitutional, and policy changes that result in improved political and civil rights. 
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Table l. Country annual means and standard deviations for selected variables, 1972 to 1988 
GDP GDP KL KL Pol Pol Civil Civl 
Growth Growth Growth Growth Rights Rights Lib Lib 
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
Afghanistan .{).0021 0.055 0.0001 0.016 6.8 0.75 6.5 0.62 
Algeria 0.0315 0.101 0.0538 0.031 6.0 0.35 6.0 0.00 
Angola .{).0574 0.146 .{).0192 0.019 6.8 0.40 6.6 0.81 
Argentina .{).0086 0.047 0.0063 0.023 3.7 1.99 3.3 1.69 
Australia 0.0122 0.024 .{).0125 0.005 1.0 0.00 1.0 0.00 
Austria 0.0217 0.020 0.0398 0.010 1.0 0.00 1.0 0.00 
Bahamas 0.0542 0.072 0.0262 0.023 1.5 0.51 2.1 0.33 
Bahrain 0.0433 0.122 0.0051 0.020 5.4 0.61 4.6 0.51 
Bangladesh 0.0209 0.028 .{).0101 0.027 4.5 1.46 4.4 0.70 
Barbados 0.0142 0.043 0.0243 0.010 1.0 0.00 1.2 0.39 
Belgium 0.0135 0.031 0.0239 0.014 1.0 0.00 1.0 0.00 
Benin .{).0110 0.057 0.0148 0.036 7.0 0.00 6.5 0.72 
Bolivia .{).0190 0.049 .{).0012 0.036 4.1 2.03 3.7 0.85 
Botswana 0.0410 0.091 0.0797 0.071 2.1 0.24 3.1 0.24 
Brazil 0.0178 0.052 0.0327 0.029 3.5 0.94 3.5 1.18 
Burkina F aso 0.0216 0.048 0.0158 0.017 5.4 1.80 4.8 1.03 
Burma 0.0322 0.020 0.0276 0.024 6.9 0.33 6.2 0.73 
Burundi 0.0121 0.057 0.0515 O.o38 6.9 0.24 6.2 0.44 
Cameroon 0.0208 0.069 0.0362 0.028 6.1 0.24 5.5 1.07 
Canada 0.0250 0.034 0.0265 0.008 1.0 0.00 1.0 0.00 
Cape Verde 0.0574 0.069 0.0059 0.019 5.7 0.48 6.1 0.57 
Cent. Afr. Rep. .{).0126 0.062 .{).0234 0.017 6.9 0.33 6.3 0.69 
Chad .{).0217 0.109 .{).0310 0.030 6.6 0.51 6.5 0.51 
Chile .{).0012 0.093 .{).0052 0.022 5.9 1.39 4.8 0.75 
China 0.0571 0.046 0.0480 0.027 6.3 0.47 6.2 0.56 
Colombia 0.0166 0.024 0.0126 0.007 2.0 0.00 2.8 0.39 
Congo 0.0217 0.152 0.0146 O.o38 6.5 0.87 6.2 0.39 
Costa Rica 0.0091 0.056 0.0235 0.023 1.0 0.00 1.0 0.00 
Cyprus 0.0282 0.106 0.0235 0.016 2.1 1.14 2.9 0.93 
Denmark 0.0087 0.035 0.0148 0.015 1.0 0.00 1.0 0.00 
Dominican Rep. 0.0010 0.043 0.0468 0.027 2.2 1.24 2.6 0.51 
Eduador 0.0170 0.065 0.0261 0.029 3.8 2.30 3.2 1.25 
Egypt 0.0427 0.083 0.0481 0.028 5.1 0.66 4.6 0.80 
El Salvador .{).0091 0.072 0.0057 0.027 3.2 1.24 3.7 0.77 
Ethiopia 0.0012 0.024 .{).0068 0.013 6.5 0.94 6.6 0.61 
Fiji .{).0013 0.061 .{).0101 0.019 2.4 1.18 2.3 0.85 
Finland 0.0252 0.029 0.0268 0.012 1.9 0.33 1.9 0.33 
France 0.0137 0.019 0.0285 0.014 1.0 0.00 1.9 0.33 
Gabon 0.0238 0.235 0.0543 0.101 6.0 0.00 6.0 0.00 
Gambia 0.0285 0.201 0.1064 0.080 2.5 0.51 2.8 0.95 
Ghana .{).0157 0.067 .{).0377 0.014 5.9 1.68 5.1 1.05 
Greece 0.0124 0.029 0.0338 0.028 2.4 1.62 2.4 1.18 
Guatemala .{).0025 0.036 0.0035 0.025 3.8 1.19 4.0 1.32 
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Table 1. Continued 
GDP GDP KL KL Pol Pol Civil Civl 
Growth Growth Growth Growth Rights Rights Lib Lib 
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
Guinea 0.0145 0.039 -0.0031 0.006 7.0 0.00 6.4 0.87 
Guinea-Bissau -0.0174 0.096 -0.0293 0.021 6.1 0.34 6.2 0.40 
Buyana -0.0183 0.116 -0.0037 0.024 4.2 0.90 3.9 1.11 
Haiti 0.0021 0.047 0.0396 0.026 6.5 0.62 5.7 0.59 
Honduras 0.0068 0.058 0.0009 0.023 4.2 1.98 3.0 0.00 
Hungary 0.0283 0.036 0.0105 0.008 5.7 0.47 5.2 0.64 
Iceland 0.0283 0.049 0.0282 0.011 1.0 0.00 1.0 0.00 
India 0.0136 O.Q38 0.0132 0.004 2.0 0.00 3.1 0.83 
Indonesia 0.0479 0.059 0.0785 0.033 5.0 0.00 5.3 0.47 
Iran 0.0169 0.150 0.0478 O.Q38 5.4 0.49 5.8 0.39 
Iraq 0.0092 0.242 0.0806 0.073 6.8 0.39 6.9 0.24 
Ireland 0.0017 0.027 0.0244 0.015 1.0 0.00 1.2 0.44 
Israel 0.0098 0.024 0.0192 0.019 2.0 0.00 2.4 0.49 
Italy 0.0279 0.028 0.0268 0.007 1.2 0.44 1.5 0.51 
Ivory Coast -0.0155 0.057 0.0105 0.046 5.9 0.33 5.2 0.44 
Jamaica -0.0201 0.045 -0.0193 0.015 1.7 0.47 2.6 0.49 
Japan 0.0248 0.029 0.0505 0.023 1.5 0.51 1.0 0.00 
Jordan 0.0294 0.090 0.0832 0.058 5.7 0.47 5.6 0.49 
Kenya -0.0056 0.039 -0.0112 0.013 5.4 0.49 4.8 0.66 
Kuwait -0.0694 0.140 0.0444 0.049 4.9 1.03 4.0 0.71 
Lesotho 0.0615 0.092 0.1147 0.050 5.2 0.53 4.6 0.79 
Liberia -0.0282 0.064 -0.0413 0.019 5.6 0.49 4.8 0.81 
Luxembourg 0.0129 0.045 0.0122 0.007 1.3 0.47 1.0 0.00 
Madagascar -0.0343 0.041 -0.0288 O.Ql5 5.2 0.44 5.2 0.88 
Malawi -0.0059 O.Q38 -0.0163 O.Q38 6.4 0.49 6.6 0.51 
Malaysia 0.0335 0.079 0.0606 0.028 2.9 0.43 4.2 0.73 
Mali 0.0086 0.037 0.0079 0.011 6.9 0.24 6.2 0.44 
Malta 0.0528 0.036 0.0379 0.025 1.6 0.51 2.5 1.12 
Mauritania 0.0025 0.097 0.0481 0.066 6.4 0.61 6.0 0.00 
Mauritius 0.0475 0.084 0.0236 0.027 2.2 0.39 2.4 0.80 
Mexico 0.0067 0.054 0.0201 0.024 3.7 0.59 3.7 0.47 
Morocco 0.0246 0.040 0.0399 0.027 4.2 0.64 4.6 0.61 
Mozambique -0.0516 0.085 -0.0273 0.021 6.5 0.52 6.8 0.45 
Nepal 0.0176 0.039 0.0484 0.020 4.4 1.50 4.4 0.51 
Netherlands 0.0101 0.019 0.0119 0.010 1.0 0.00 1.0 0.00 
New Zealand 0.0001 0.040 -0.0185 0.013 1.0 0.00 1.0 0.00 
Nicaragua -0.0460 0.181 -0.0021 0.037 5.1 0.43 4.6 0.61 
Niger 
-0.0029 0.079 -0.0053 0.029 6.8 0.39 6.0 0.00 
Nigeria -0.0164 0.079 0.0302 0.071 5.1 1.90 4.1 0.86 
North Yemen 0.0470 0.056 0.0854 0.077 5.4 0.62 4.8 0.44 
Norway 0.0238 0.034 0.0276 0.009 1.0 0.00 1.0 0.00 
Pakistan 0.0244 0.031 -0.0143 0.009 4.9 1.58 4.9 0.60 
Panama 0.0107 0.040 0.0212 0.026 5.7 1.10 4.6 1.17 
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Table 1. Continued 
GDP GDP KL KL Pol Pol Civil Civl 
Growth Growth Growth Growth Rights Rights Lib Lib 
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
Paraguay 0.0250 0.089 0.0597 O.o35 5.0 0.35 5.4 0.49 
Peru ..{).0083 0.068 0.0121 0.024 3.9 2.12 3.7 0.92 
Philippines 0.0117 0.051 0.0216 0.029 4.4 1.00 4.3 1.21 
Poland ..{).0073 0.076 ..{).0152 0.005 5.8 0.39 5.2 0.64 
Portugal 0.0191 0.055 0.0395 0.027 2.3 1.61 2.6 1.33 
Rwanda 0.0099 0.048 0.0447 0.018 6.4 0.49 5.7 0.47 
Saudi Arabia 0.0087 0.151 0.1818 0.094 6.0 0.00 6.4 0.51 
Senegal 0.0014 0.041 ..{).0131 0.007 4.3 1.26 4.1 0.86 
Sierra Loene ..{).0296 0.062 ..{).0103 0.012 5.2 0.64 5.0 0.00 
Singapore 0.0490 0.040 0.0955 0.021 4.5 0.51 5.0 0.00 
Somalia 0.0042 0.162 0.0481 0.040 7.0 0.00 6.8 0.44 
South Africa 0.0018 0.070 0.0073 O.Q18 4.8 0.40 5.8 0.45 
South Korea 0.0583 0.055 0.0764 0.026 4.5 0.80 5.2 0.83 
Spain 0.0109 0.029 0.0255 0.019 2.5 1.74 3.1 1.48 
Sri Lanka 0.0264 0.051 0.0337 0.014 2.4 0.51 3.4 0.62 
Sudan 0.0074 0.075 ..{).0012 0.029 5.4 0.79 5.5 0.51 
Suriname 0.0040 0.097 0.0167 0.037 4.2 2.26 3.8 1.88 
Swaziland ..{).0135 0.103 0.0322 O.D38 5.3 0.59 4.9 1.11 
Sweden 0.0148 0.024 0.0169 0.010 1.1 0.24 1.0 0.00 
Switzerland 0.0150 0.035 0.0264 0.010 1.0 0.00 1.0 0.00 
Syria 0.0291 0.119 0.0477 0.037 5.8 0.64 6.6 0.49 
Taiwan 0.0550 O.D38 0.0798 0.034 2.2 0.44 4.8 0.66 
Tanzania 0.0030 0.053 0.0019 0.018 6.0 0.00 6.0 0.00 
Thailand 0.0362 0.040 0.0414 0.013 4.1 1.56 3.8 0.88 
Togo ..{).0053 0.080 0.0280 0.048 6.6 0.49 5.9 0.33 
Trin. & Tob. ..{).0121 0.149 0.0209 0.040 1.6 0.51 1.9 0.43 
Tunisia 0.0203 0.037 0.0151 0.017 5.6 0.49 5.0 0.35 
Turkey 0.0198 0.043 0.0405 0.023 2.8 1.03 4.0 0.87 
Uganda 0.0493 0.189 ..{).0175 0.026 5.8 1.15 5.6 1.27 
United Kingdom 0.0200 0.029 0.0258 0.010 1.0 0.00 1.0 0.00 
United States 0.0158 0.032 0.0171 0.009 1.0 0.00 1.0 0.00 
United. Arab E. ..{).0252 0.109 ..{).0185 0.096 5.3 0.59 5.0 0.00 
Uruguay 0.0060 0.065 0.0115 0.025 4.2 1.64 4.2 1.59 
Venezuela 0.0092 0.097 0.0271 0.043 1.2 0.44 2.0 0.00 
West Germany 0.0185 0.027 0.0233 0.007 1.0 0.00 1.6 0.49 
Yugoslavia 0.0243 0.046 0.0274 0.009 5.9 0.24 5.3 0.47 
Zaire ..{).0443 0.060 0.0258 0.028 6.6 0.51 6.4 0.49 
Zambia ..{).0514 0.079 ..{).0501 0.027 5.1 0.24 5.0 0.35 
Zimbabwe ..{).0007 O.D78 ..{).0158 0.020 4.8 1.13 5.2 0.53 
Sample Averages 0.0102 0.068 0.0223 0.027 4.2 0.64 4.1 0.56 
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Table 2. Illustration of political and civil rights reform, qualitative timing variable construction for 
Bangladesh 
Political Civil 
Year Rights RPDI RPD2 RPD3 RPD4 RPD5 Rights RCDI RCD2 RCD3 RCD4 RCD5 
1972 4 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 
1973 4 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 
1974 4 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 
1975 5 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 
1976 4 I 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 
1977 4 0 I 0 0 0 6 1 0 0 0 0 
1978 4 0 0 I 0 0 4 0 I 0 0 0 
1979 3 0 0 0 I 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 
1980 3 0 0 0 0 I 3 0 0 0 1 0 
1981 4 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 I 
1982 5 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 
1983 5 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 
1984 5 0 0 0 0 0 5 I 0 0 0 0 
1985 5 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 1 0 0 0 
1986 5 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 1 0 0 
1987 5 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 0 
1988 5 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 1 
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Table 3. Time series models of per capita GDP growth rates 
Chi-Sq Chi-Sq 
Model AIC Lags 1-6 Lags 7-12 AR(l) AR(2) MA(1) MA(2) 
Raw Data 0.000 0.000 
0.188 
AR(1) -4004.78 0.016 0.046 (7.83) 
0.542 0.371 
AR(1),MA(l) -4010.14 0.401 0.392 (5.50) (3.41) 
0.174 0.065 
AR(2) -4008.68 0.203 0.266 (7.22) (2.61) 
0.602 -{).015 0.430 
AR(2),MA(1) -4008.17 0.268 0.308 (2.07) (-.22) (1.49) 
1.349 .{).450 1.179 .{).315 
AR(2),MA(2) -4006.25 0.119 0.238 (.96) (-.62) (.84) (-.65) 
Notes: Numbers under the Chi-square column report probability values for the null hypothesis of white 
noise. 
Numbers in the AR and MA rows report coefficient estimates. Numbers in parentheses in the AR 
and MA rows are !-statistics for the associated parameter estimates. 
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Table 4. Pooled growth regression results 
Permanent GDP Transitory GDP Growth Transitory 
Dependent Variable Growth Rate Rate GDP Growth 
Independent Variable Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value Estimate 
INTERCEPT -0.00736 0.000 -0.01389 0.177 -0.01256 
Economic Variables 
CKL 0.15883 0.000 0.44686 0.000 0.44258 
RGDPTT 0.00063 0.573 -0.00000 0.758 0.00000 
POPCHG 0.03081 0.299 -0.19377 0.244 -0.24483 
Geographic Regions 
AMER 0.00317 0.041 0.00883 0.310 0.01195 
ASIA 0.00592 0.000 0.02132 0.016 0.02296 
AFRl 0.00408 0.006 0.01441 0.081 0.01550 
EURO 0.00463 0.010 0.01273 0.207 0.01649 
Institutional Freedom Levels 
P10R2 -0.00114 0.424 -0.00417 0.604 
P3T05 -0.00197 0.049 -0.00068 0.914 
C10R2 0.00381 0.036 0.01453 0.154 
C3T05 0.00249 O.Q\5 0.00506 0.376 
Institutional Freedom Reforms 
RPD1 0.00019 0.901 -0.00377 0.651 -0.00371 
RPD2 0.00081 0.580 -0.00894 0.279 -0.00970 
RPD3 -0.00079 0.625 -0.01831 0.042 -0.01851 
RPD4 -0.00141 0.398 0.01202 0.199 0.01181 
RPD5 0.00246 0.154 -0.01800 0.063 -0.01799 
RCD1 0.00074 0.604 0.00913 0.256 0.01212 
RCD2 0.00293 0.050 -0.00549 0.512 -0.00001 
RCD3 0.00202 0.202 0.00719 0.419 0.00838 
RCD4 0.00328 0.068 0.01540 0.126 0.01744 
RCD5 0.00563 0.003 -0.01144 0.284 -0.01030 
Regression Statistics 
r-squared 0.0238 0.087 0.086 
n 1775 1775 1775 
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Table 5. Relationship between civil liberties and political rights reforms 
Years following reform in political rights 
Years following reform in 
Civil Liberties 0 1 2 3 4 5 Row Total 
0 1440 64 63 51 52 49 1719 
1 73 31 6 2 3 6 121 
2 60 7 15 5 1 3 91 
3 49 8 6 12 4 1 80 
4 34 4 4 5 10 3 60 
5 32 4 3 3 4 8 54 
Column Total 1688 118 97 78 74 70 2125 
Table 6. Pooled regional growth regressions with dependent variable as permanent component of per capita GOP growth 
America Asia Africa Europe OPEC 
Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value 
INTERCEP -0.00729 0.027 0.00394 0.268 0.00474 0.143 -0.00559 0.001 -0.00921 0.194 
CKL 0.25961 0.000 0.15134 0.000 0.14759 0.000 0.26255 0.000 0.13265 0.001 
RGDP1T 0.00454 O.o75 0.00292 0.308 0.00985 0.148 0.00545 0.000 -0.00777 0.133 
POPCHG 0.05117 0.542 -0.16185 0.242 -0.27544 0.008 0.42042 0.000 0.04945 0.786 
P10R2 -0.00150 0.557 -0.00428 0.097 -0.00265 0.482 -0.00292 0.242 0.00218 0.924 
P3T05 -0.00501 0.031 -0.00619 0.002 -0.00234 0.249 0.01084 0.000 0.00323 0.599 
C10R2 0.00326 0.389 0.00101 0.785 -0.00674 0.238 0.00085 0.696 0.01479 0.530 
C3T05 0.00463 0.128 0.00498 0.017 0.00286 0.133 0.00622 0.258 
RPD1 -0.00283 0.438 0.00101 0.700 -0.00252 0.344 -0.00007 0.975 0.00806 0.389 
RPD2 -0.00357 0.260 0.00177 0.502 -0.00080 0.785 -0.00108 0.603 -0.00118 0.895 
RPD3 -0.00216 0.571 0.00111 0.678 -0.00064 0.843 0.00024 0.918 -0.01683 O.o75 
RPD4 -0.00639 0.074 -0.00036 0.893 0.00278 0.408 -0.00249 0.259 -0.00727 0.478 
RPD5 -0.00120 0.729 0.00104 0.659 0.00589 0.068 -0.00197 0.372 0.00205 0.833 
RCDI 0.00347 0.313 -0.00116 0.622 0.00205 0.506 0.00084 0.737 -0.00212 0.842 
RCD2 0.00299 0.476 0.00272 0.255 0.00159 0.657 0.00043 0.824 0.00554 0.594 
RCD3 0.00799 0.074 0.00224 0.361 0.00315 0.344 0.00239 0.365 0.00256 0.825 
RCD4 0.00647 0.147 0.00152 0.550 0.00172 0.632 -0.00196 0.370 0.01637 0.089 
RCD5 0.00306 0.479 0.00168 0.487 0.01023 0.007 0.00162 0.432 0.01038 0.282 
r-squared 0.334 0.401 0.235 0.355 0.222 
# of countries 29 18 44 23 II 
Table 7. Pooled regional growth regressions dependent variable as transitory component of per capita GOP growth 
America Asia Africa Europe OPEC 
Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value 
INTERCEP -0.01866 0.304 0.05817 0.003 0.03244 0.080 -0.00559 0.001 -0.03069 0.376 
CKL 0.79545 0.000 0.30735 0.005 0.36191 0.000 0.26255 0.000 0.50291 0.006 
RGDPTT 0.00000 0.883 -0.00000 0.319 0.00000 0.994 0.00000 0.000 -0.00000 0.464 
POPCHG -0.12922 0.781 -2.22802 0.003 -1.37301 0.020 0.42042 0.000 -0.16099 0.857 
PIOR2 0.01121 0.426 -0.03394 0.016 -0.01217 0.572 -0.00292 0.242 0.01730 0.877 
P3T05 -0.00208 0.871 -0.02631 0.012 -0.00684 0.556 0.04084 0.000 0.07760 0.011 
CIOR2 0.00456 0.828 0.03022 0.135 -0.00496 0.879 0.00085 0.6% 0.04278 0.711 
C3T05 0.00546 0.745 0.03376 0.003 0.01367 0.208 -0.00548 0.838 
RPD1 -0.02896 0.153 -0.00708 0.618 -0.01377 0.366 -0.00007 0.975 -0.05185 0.258 
RPD2 -0.01060 0.546 -0.00205 0.886 -0.00431 0.798 -0.00108 0.603 -0.13493 0.003 
RPD3 -0.03823 0.071 -0.01117 0.440 0.01125 0.540 0.00024 0.918 -0.06750 0.144 
RPD4 -0.01812 0.359 0.00372 0.797 0.03230 0.093 -0.00249 0.259 -0.02055 0.682 
RPD5 -0.03142 0.100 0.00890 0.488 -0.01886 0.306 -0.00197 0.372 -0.06400 0.182 
RCD1 0.02310 0.225 0.00702 0.583 0.00426 0.810 0.00084 0.737 -0.03925 0.453 
RCD2 0.01923 0.407 -0.00249 0.848 0.00543 0.790 0.00043 0.824 -0.03940 0.440 
RCD3 0.01827 0.460 -0.00145 0.913 -0.00791 0.677 0.00239 0.365 0.08058 0.157 
RCD4 0.0!846 0.454 -0.00201 0.884 0.03748 0.069 -0.00196 0.370 0.00964 0.837 
RCD5 0.02247 0.347 -0.00952 0.469 -0.03257 0.132 0.00162 0.432 -0.04439 0.347 
r-squared 0.142 0.192 0.082 0.123 0.212 
# of countries 29 18 44 23 II 
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